European Union (where greater dialogue between science and the public has been normalized), and in the clean divisions between science and politics, between scientific data and non-science criteria, and between seemingly rational actors and "activists." The notion that there might be three credible but contradictory scientific opinions on any regulatory matter is dismissed as virtually impossible -hence the adjective "supposedly" when discussing different scientific opinions. The editorial therefore represents a particular view of expertise in law/science relations, namely one that eclipses genuine scientific controversy. That is, the environmental impact review (conducted by the Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service branch) is assumed to be "science," while critics are marginalized as pseudoscientific activists, and Vilsack's acknowledged doubt is dismissed as politically-driven.
Of course, the fact that the editorial appeared in the Wall Street Journal could lead one to discredit the argument as pro-agri-business, and its status as an editorial opinion rather than a news report reduces its significance. For my purposes, however, the editorial highlights the significance of one's images of science and scientific expertise and their role in legal contexts, whether in administrative decision-making involving science and technology or in the courtroom when a lawsuit involves scientific issues. Clearly, law relies on science, but how do we picture that relationship? One resource for exploring our understanding of science and its place in law is popular culture, including the literary representatives of law and science in novels, plays, and movies, as well as in historical narratives. My question in this book, without exhaustively surveying the field but by offering some examples, is what do we learn about the place of science in law when we consider the popular culture images of that relationship? A preliminary question for the reader, however, may be why those sources -stories about science in law -are promising for the study of law/science relations. My answer is that popular culture images of law, on the one hand, and popular culture images of science, on the other, have proved to be fruitful for understanding law, and science, respectively.
For example, the law-and-literature movement is based in part upon the notion, controversial in some critics' eyes, that literary representations of law and lawyers can offer insights into contemporary legal processes and institutions. While a fictionalized account of a legal proceeding may in some respects be inferior to an historical or scholarly legal account, fiction about law and lawyers can nevertheless function to raise ethical issues, demonstrate how established law might reflect social bias, or provide models for reform. Indeed, Richard Weisberg refers to literature as a "source of law," providing "unique insights into law's underpinnings" that can be "richer and certainly more accessible" than philosophy of law texts (Weisberg, Poethics, 1992:3) . The notion that literature is a source of law sounds controversial -law is usually found in statutes, judicial opinions, reputable commentaries -but Weisberg means to make a strong point that literature about lawyers is not dispensable. From another vantage, Cynthia Bond argues that cinema participates in the constitution of race and racial classifications, such that audiences viewing a law film actually construct legally significant categories as part of their spectatorship (Bond, "Laws of Race/Laws of Representation…," Tex. Rev. Ent. & Sports 11:219-65 (2010) ). While that too may sound counter-intuitive, the capacity of visual media to construct culture, and the way that law reflects culture in its operation and interpretation, grants to popular culture an oft-hidden power to create social realities. Thus William MacNeil coins the term lex populi (people's law or pop law) in turning to literary, televisual, and cinematic sources for jurisprudential insights (MacNeil, Lex Populi, 2007:1) .
Such sources "not only reach a much larger audience than standard legal texts, but potentially … help restore topics of jurisprudential import -justice, rights, ethics -to where they belong: … with the community at large" (MacNeil 2007:1-2) . Historical accuracy, which some might see as the primary value of literary representations of law and legal processes, is somewhat beside the point in light of the capacity of fictional images of law to direct sympathies, encourage moral judgments, or create hero-figures, which effects can in turn influence how law students, lawyers, and judges respectively learn, practice, and apply the law.
Similarly, literature-and-science studies are based in part on the notion, likewise controversial, that popular culture images of science and scientists have the power to change public perceptions of the scientific enterprise, influence government policy, inspire (or discourage) future scientists, affect research support and funding, and even create public consensus concerning a particular scientific theory. For example, there is a literary tradition of negative portrayals of science and scientists, documented by Haynes (From Faust to Strangelove, 1994) and suggesting that science is dangerous, or that scientists are amoral; likewise, Tudor (Monsters and Mad Scientists, 1989) documented the persistent image of the mad scientist in the history of horror movies. Both traditions can be linked to cultural awareness of the risks of science and the need for ethical or other regulatory controls. But there is also a contemporary backlash among scientists interested in (or writing) science fiction. Jennifer Rohn, the author of two laboratory novels (and editor of the website LabLit.com) coined the term "Lab Scientists, in Goodman's novel, rely on luck, "charm money from NIH," crave recognition, and suppress data in a feudal institution of jealousy and politics (Goodman 2006:18, 31, 127, 182, 211, 230) . Thus the pursuit of realism in Lab Lit, albeit escaping the negative portrayals of Frankenstein-genre clichés, actually enhances the critical potential for offering the public a modest, rather than idealized, view of science. While one might not be able, in hard science fiction studies, to replicate Weisberg's form of argument -literature is not a source of scientific knowledge -it is arguably a source of knowledge about science, and certainly a source of popular culture images of science.
My own effort is aimed at combining (1) law-and-literature studies (wherein literature offers insights into legal processes and institutions) with (2) literature-and-science studies (wherein literature offers insights into scientific practice and progress) to enrich the discourse of (3) law/science relations (which is itself a field of study that focuses on contemporary rules of evidence and regulatory frameworks, and seldom relies on literary or historical sources). In such an enterprise, we do learn something about law, especially the ways in which law relies on science and sometimes idealizes the capacity of science to settle legal disputes; we also learn something about science, especially the ways in which science is like law -institutional, rhetorical, cultural, and even political. But my primary goal is to focus on stories that explore the relationship between law and science, and especially the cultural images of science that prevail in legal contexts.
The particular approach in this book contrasts with but parallels other methods of exploring the ways that expertise is transferred to or constructed within legal contexts.
Sociologists of scientific knowledge might proceed by conducting ethnographic studies -visiting laboratories, interviewing scientists -to understand how credibility and expertise are established, And of course, historians and philosophers of science attend to questions concerning the origins and development of, as well as criteria for judging, scientific expertise.
By contrast, the subject of inquiry for this book, literary and historical images of scientific expertise in law, lies at the intersection of the three aforementioned interdisciplinary projects: law and science, law and literature, and literature and science. The first two projects are primarily associated with legal scholarship -i.e., "law" is typically "the privileged element" or object of interdisciplinary inquiry in the two dyads (law and science, law and literature), insofar as the inquiry is typically concerned with what literature (both its texts that represent law and lawyers and its critical methodologies) or scientific knowledge can tell us about or do for law (Pether, "Language," in Law and the Humanities (eds. Sarat et al.) 2009:318 n.7). The third project (literature and science), conversely, is not typically viewed as a field of science, but is rather associated with literature (both its texts that represent science or scientists, and its critical methodologies, including language and rhetoric studies) or science studies, including historical, philosophical, or sociological studies of science. My own focus on literary and historical images of expertise (appropriated into legal contexts) simultaneously harnesses elements from all three projects to create a hybrid enterprise of sorts.
The law and science project is not so much a unified field of inquiry as it is a general recognition that the understanding of science and technology is crucial for numerous areas of law, including not only scientific expertise to offer insights in the courtroom and in regulatory contexts, but also patent law, bio-ethics, and regulation of science and technology (including pollution abatement, genetically-modified food safety, pre-market drug testing, and restrictions on synthetic biology, to name but a few). The relationship of law and science is therefore the subject of conferences, journals, associations (e.g., the ABA section on science and technology), and law school courses. Nevertheless, the "project" of law and science can be variously defined, and because its perceived elements are part of numerous other sub-disciplines (evidence law, administrative law, environmental law, health law, cyber-law), its boundaries are vague. In any event, since this book is about scientific expertise in law, albeit focused on literary and historical images, my inquiry can be located within the "law and science" project.
As to the law and literature, and literature and science, projects, and the potential for a hybrid law, literature, and science project, they are the subject of Chapter 2. Acknowledging the difficulty of identifying law-lit and lit-sci as "movements" or clearly bounded sub-disciplines, I explore the twin inquires in law and literature studies (i.e., law in literature, and law as literature) and the twin inquires in literature and science studies (i.e., science in literature, and science as literature). I characterize my approach as a hybrid because, for example, a fictional text about a scientist testifying in court is not only a literary representation of law (law in literature), as well as literary representation of a scientist (science in literature), but the testimony of the scientist is both a legally significant text (law as literature) and a scientific text (science as literature) that can be analyzed using literary critical or rhetorical tools. I conclude in Chapter 8 that the foregoing stories reveal important aspects of science and its interaction with legal processes and institutions. Challenging the idealized view of science as a catalog of stabilizing truths to be appropriated into law, the literary materials selected for this book reveal science to be a social enterprise involving public relations, cultural authority, contradictory self-images, ethical dimensions, and rhetorical strategies that together determine the place of science in law.
I consider this book to be introductory and suggestive, rather than comprehensive, with respect to the potential value, for law, of reflecting on stories of appropriated scientific expertise.
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals
(Daubert 1993), there was a barrage of scholarly interest and publication concerning the appropriate standards for judicial assessment of the scientific validity of expert testimony.
Questions about the nature of science and scientific methodology, and whether the image(s) of science developed by courts hearing cases involving scientific expertise were accurate or realistic, sustained numerous legal debates in the decade following Daubert (1993). And then, just as those debates might have died down, the so-called forensic sciences, especially identification techniques (other than DNA technologies) associated with police crime laboratories, began to come under a severe scrutiny that continues today. Questions about the nature of science and scientific methodology, and whether some forensic "sciences" are science at all, have therefore been revived in legal contexts. This book, in an indirect fashion due to its attention to presumably marginal (from a scientific perspective) literary and historical sources, focuses on and questions some of the contemporary images of science in law.
The project described in this book intersects with, benefits from, and sometimes builds upon the work of numerous scholars in law, literature, and/or science. First, in the wake of Daubert, Beyea and Berger identified two competing visions of science or "schools of thought" that judges alternatively draw upon in their judgments of scientific validity: (i) Science as Logical Reasoning, wherein science is viewed as an accessible catalog of truths, comporting "with the popular concept of a scientist doggedly collecting irrefutable facts" and moving "from observations or data to general laws of nature"; and (ii) Science as Process, wherein science is viewed as a contentious process of "intuition, conjecture, inference, professional judgment, and repeated testing," involving subjective elements in each step of the production of scientific knowledge (Beyea and Berger, "Scientific Misconceptions…," Law & Contemp. Prob. 64:328-330 (2001) ). While one might criticize Beyea and Berger for setting up a superficial contrast between the so-called positivist tradition and a fairly conventional process account which they associate with Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn, thereby appearing to be oblivious to decades of scholarship in science studies (or the sociology of scientific knowledge) that moves well beyond
Popper and Kuhn by identifying the role(s) of social, rhetorical, and institutional aspects of the production of scientific knowledge, it is nevertheless helpful to identify visions of science that matter in law and influence legal decisions. Moreover, the judiciary may well be limited, in its understanding of science, to a narrow set of conventional perspectives, and one of the purposes of this book is to try to broaden that horizon in mainstream legal discourse.
Second, in the debates over environmental protection, some have raised the notion of opposing "worldviews" concerning technological progress. Scientific authority and public trust in science are not given, but depend upon cultural images of science, thereby intertwining science with social frameworks.
Finally, the possibility of a law, literature, and science fiction enterprise was explored over a decade ago by Bruce Rockwood, who highlighted an unfortunate tendency in law and literature studies to focus on canonical literature, rather than literature more widely read. Science Fiction, while referred to in some law and literature collections and criticism, remains a largely unmined mother-
[lode] for explaining our understandings of law through literature (Rockwood, "New Possibilities,"
Leg. Stud. Forum 23:267-8 (1999) ).
In this perspective, science fiction (i) shapes "metaphors of everyday life, including those we use to view law and society"; (ii) explores political, legal and ideological alternatives ... and possible futures"; and (iii) has the potential to "explore and develop jurisprudential concepts" (Rockwood 1999:269, 271-272 
